

~~SECRET~~

Thru: Mr. Stassen
Mr. Matteson

December 20, 1955

25X1

Probable CIA Comments to Revised Volume V.

General:

I. It is possible that CIA will pick on your Sec. II, para. A, "No fundamental or basic dissent or divergence from Vol. V was received from any Department or Agency." While CIA's "dissent" was not stated directly, it appears to me that it was at least implied in two general ways:

1. CIA maintained that an inspection plan envisioning 20,000 to 30,000 inspectors would be too large for the USSR to accept.

2. CIA "dissented" with the degree of disarmament envisaged in Vol. V.

A. It would not be enough to attract Soviet interest.

B. The lack of specific U.S. commitment to large reductions in armaments, together with the size of the proposed inspection force, would place the U.S. in a vulnerable propaganda position.

C. While the inspection plan of the type apparently envisaged "would effectively eliminate the surprise element of an attack given present Soviet capabilities," greater reductions and/or limitations in armaments would be necessary to maintain such security from surprise attack in the future.

II. Probable CIA comments on specific items:

1. On Item 4, "Prevent, retard, or minimize the establishment of a substantial intercontinental missile capacity and of an expanded nuclear weapons capability by the USSR." CIA will be interested in what your ideas are on how you intend implementing this thought, particularly since you are presently postponing Item 10.

2. Item 6, "Agree to reciprocal inspection generally along the lines proposed in this report, etc." CIA will probably bring up the 20,000 to 30,000 figure as being out of line with possible Soviet acceptance. While you can point out that JCS is currently engaged in designing a minimal plan, I think that you could also parry such a question by inquiring what size inspection force would CIA consider that the USSR would be likely to accept as part of a general arms limitation agreement.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

3. Item 7, "Accept modest initial reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments on a reciprocal basis, etc." CIA's comments (and subsequent telephone conversations) indicate that they are not satisfied that modest reductions would be enough from the viewpoint of the U.S. propaganda position and also from the viewpoint of acceptability to the USSR. This is debatable, of course. However, it appears to me that you may be able to argue that "modest initial reductions" would have the effect of meeting the third point of CIA criticism, that the inspection system as envisaged would not protect the U.S. against surprise attack given future Soviet capabilities. This, of course, will depend on your making it clear that these reductions are in fact a small step further than your earlier concept of a "freeze," and on the assumption that "modest initial reductions" include nuclear carrying weapons.

4. Item 10, "Provide that satellites and intercontinental and outer space rockets shall be developed only through international collaboration, etc." CIA may question this postponement in the light of Mr. Allen Dulles' consideration that the presently envisaged inspection plan would not be adequate to prevent surprise given future Soviet capabilities, particularly the Satellite and ICBM field.

5. Item 17, "If an inspection system such as here described is installed, the U.S. will contemplate a gradual equitable reduction on a reciprocal basis of nuclear weapons carrying capacity and of conventional forces and conventional armaments, etc." CIA's comments (and a subsequent telephone conversation) indicate that again they do not feel the reductions as stated here are as specific or as large as to make the plan acceptable to the USSR or as to place the U.S. in a tenable international negotiating position. That part of Mr. Allen Dulles' comment on this subject which pertained to safeguarding U.S. future security against surprise attack may be met by referring to your "modest initial reductions," assuming that conventional weapons include future developments in nuclear weapons carrying capacity.

6. From a telephone conversation with Mr. Bundy, Mr. Amory's deputy to the NSC Planning Board, I gather you may be questioned at the 21 December Planning Board session with reference to your Discussion on Item 7 (p. 5 your current report to the NSC).

"The Department of State urged greater emphasis on reductions, partly on the theory that free world armed forces would be reduced in any event and the bargaining position should be used before it becomes a wasting asset. This appraisal of the Department of State is not concurred in."

Mr. Bundy felt this last sentence was ambiguous in several respects:

(a) Who did not concur? (b) Did "appraisal" refer to the statement that "free world armed forces would be reduced in any event," in which case you would be stating that such a trend was not likely? (c) Or did "appraisal" refer to "the Department of State urged greater emphasis?"

It seems likely you may be asked for clarification of this wording.

FWJ:fcs